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COMMENTS
Accumulated Earnings Tax: An Appeal for Flexibility
A principal incentive for the incorporation of a business is the dif-
ferential in the tax rates imposed upon individuals and corporations.
Currently the federal income tax imposed upon individuals is graduated
to a maximum rate of seventy percent,' while that on corporations is
twenty-two percent on the first 25,000 dollars of taxable income and an
effective forty-eight percent on the balance over 25,000 dollars.' Due
to this differential, 3 the high income taxpayer is induced to use the cor-
porate form for the accumulation of wealth. As long as the taxpayer
is able to control the dividend-paying policy of the corporation, and thus
avoid the double taxation of corporate income,4 earnings may be ac-
cumulated and subsequently realized at the lower capital gains rate
upon liquidation or the sale of his stock.5 If the taxpayer retains his
shares throughout his lifetime, he will be able upon his death to pass on
the accumulated gain relatively cheaply as a result of the stepped-up
basis that the shares will then acquire under section 1014.11
Since the Revenue Act of 1913,1 Congress has provided a statutory
scheme designed to meet this tax avoidance technique. Although sev-
eral different schemes have been enacted over the years,' the current
approach, while not without its shortcomings, appears to counter this
tax avoidance incentive and to prompt corporations to distribute their
earning and profits." The 1954 Internal Revenue Code imposes a
severe penalty tax10 on a corporation 1 that allows earnings and prof-
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
2. Id. § 11.
3. The introduction of a maximum tax on earned income, reduced by certain tax
preferences, has taken some of the inequality out of this differential. Id. § 1348.
4. The income will be taxed once when it is received by the corporation and again
upon receipt by a shareholder in the form of a dividend. Id. § 301.
5. Id. §§ 1201-02.
6. Id. § 1014.
7. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, § IIA(2), 38 Stat. 114.
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 102(a), 53 Stat. 47 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 531). In addition to the accumulated earnings tax penalty, Congress has
imposed a "personal holding company" tax on certain corporations that are used merely
to collect "passive income." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 541.
9. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531-37.
10. Id. § 531 provides:
In addition to other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is hereby imposed
for each taxable year on the accumulated taxable income (as defined in section
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its to accumulate beyond the "reasonable needs of the business" when
this accumulation is "for the purpose of avoiding the income tax"12 on
its shareholders. Section 532 imposes this penalty on all corporations
except domestic and foreign personal holding companies and those ex-
empt from taxation under Subchapter F of the Internal Revenue Code.13
Although section 532 makes the presence of a tax avoidance pur-
pose the ultimate test for applying the penalty tax under section 531,
the central controversy in the vast majority of section 531 cases has
been whether a business has accumulated its earnings and profits "be-
yond the reasonable needs of the business.' 1 4  Section 533 states that
the presence of an unreasonable accumulation is "determinative of the
purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the
corporation by the preponderance of evidence shall prove to the con-
trary."' 5 In analyzing an accumulated earnings tax problem, three is-
sues are of primary importance: who is to have the burden of proof;'0
535) of every corporation described in section 532, an accumulated earnings
tax equal to the sum of-
(1) 27 percent of the accumulated taxable income not in excess of
$100,000, plus
(2) 38 percent of the accumulated taxable income in excess of
$100,000.
11. As a practical matter, section 531 is applicable only to closely held corpora-
tions since shareholder tax savings is not likely to be the reason for the accumulation
where the stock is widely held in small lots. In 1954 a proposal was made to exempt
corporations with more than 1,500 shareholders, none of whom owned more than 10%
of the stock. This proposal was rejected on the ground that it would be too difficult
to administer. S. REP. No. 1623, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954).
12. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 532 provides:
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-The accumulated earnings tax imposed by section
531 shall apply to every corporation (other than those described in subsection
(b)) formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with
respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by per-
mitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distrib-
uted.
(b) ExCEPTnONS.-The accumulated earnings tax imposed by section 531
shall not apply to-
(1) a personal holding company (as defined in section 542),
(2) a foreign personal holding company (as defined in section 552),
or
(3) a corporation exempt from tax under subchapter F (section 501
and following).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Sears Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966);
Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1960).
15. INT. RV. CODE OF 1954, § 533(a) provides:
(a) UNREASONABLE ACCUMULATION DETERMINATIVE OF PURPOSE.-For
purposes of section 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation
are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall
be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to share-
holders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall
prove to the contrary.
16. Id. § 534 provides:
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whether a tax avoidance purpose is present;17 and whether the earn-
ings and profits have been accumulated beyond the reasonable needs
of the business.' 8  The practioal purpose in ,the reasonableness test of
section 533 rather than the other two factors becomes apparent when
sections 535(c)' 9 and 534(c) are examined. In theory a court could
find that earnings were accumulated for a tax avoidance purpose de-
spite the presence of a reasonable need for the accumulation; however,
the tax credit provision of section 535(c) provides that any reasonable
need will operate to reduce the accumulated income that is subject to
the tax.20 As a result, a corporation may have been formed or availed
of for the purpose of avoiding income tax, but will still not be subject
to liability under section 531 if the credit under section 535(c) equals
or exceeds the taxable base for imposition of the accumulated earnings
tax under section 535(a) and (b).
(a) GENERAL RUJLE.-In any proceeding before the Tax Court involving
a notice of deficiency based in whole or in part on the allegation that all or
any part of the earnings and profits have been permitted to accumulate beyond
the reasonable needs of the business, the burden of proof with respect to such
allegation shall-
(2) if the taxpayer has submitted the statement described in subsec-
tion (c), be on the Secretary or his delegate with respect to the grounds
set forth in such statement in accordance with the provisions of such sub-
section.
(c) STATEMENT BY TAxPAYER.-Within such time (but not less than 30
days) after the mailing of the notification described in subsection (b) as the
Secretary or his delegate may prescribe by regulations, the taxpayer may submit
a statement of the grounds (together with facts sufficient to show the basis
thereof) on which the taxpayer relies to establish that all or any part of the
earnings and profits have not been permitted to accumulate beyond the reason-
able needs of the business.
17. See id. § 532, quoted in note 12 supra.
18. See INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 533, quoted in note 15 supra.
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 535 provides:
(a) DEFINrIoN.For purposes of this subtitle, the term "accumulated
taxable income" means the taxable income, adjusted in the manner provided
in subsection (b), minus the sum of the dividends paid deduction (as defined
in section 561) and the accumulated earnings credit (as defined in subsection
C)).
(c) AccumuLATED EARNINGS CR .Drr.
(1) GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of subsection (a), in the case of
a corporation . . . the accumulated earnings credit is (A) an amount equal
to such part of the earnings and profits for the taxable year as are retained
for the reasonable needs of the business, minus (B) the deduction allowed by
subsection (b)(6). For the purposes of this paragraph, the amount of the
earnings and profits for the taxable year which are retained is the amount by
which the earnings and profits for the taxable year exceed the dividends paid
deduction (as defined in section 561) for such year.
(2) MINIMUM CREDIT.-The credit allowable under paragraph (1)
shall in no case be less than the amount by which $100,000 exceeds the accum-
ulated earnings and profits of the corporation at the close of the preceding tax-
able year.
20. See, e.g., Dielectric Materials Co., 57 T.C. 587 (1972).
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Section 534 provides that a corporate taxpayer can shift the bur-
den of proving whether earnings and profits have been accumulated be-
yond the reasonable needs of the business by following certain simple
procedures. Nevertheless, some of the earliest decisions severely lim-
ited the usefulness of this section by holding that regardless of a shift
in the burden, the ultimate burden of proving the absence of a tax
avoidance purpose remained with the corporation.21 Only recently
have several commentators indicated that this provision can be of sub-
stantial benefit to the taxpayer.22 The taxpayer, though, should not rely
on a shift in the burden of proof, but should only view it as another
tool in proving his case.
As stated above, the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax
will hinge upon an estimation of what are "reasonable business needs."
The "needs" basically are twofold: requirements for a business' cur-
rent operations and requirements for its extraordinary needs. 23  A busi-
ness' current operational needs, often loosely referred to as working
capital needs, include such items as payroll, overhead, inventory, and
taxes. Extraordinary needs include such items as replacement of plant
or equipment, retirement of bona fide indebtedness, expansion of busi-
ness, and self-insurance.
A set of examples illustrating the computation of accumulated
taxable income and the accumulated earnings credit are reproduced in
the footnote.24  Wide variations in accumulated taxable income are
21. See, e.g., Pelton Steel Casting Co., 28 T.C. 153 (1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 278
(7th Cir. 1958).
22. S. WErrHoRN & R. NOALL, THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAx, 119-25 (1968);
Hamel, Section 531: Operating Cycle Analysis of Working Capital Needs, 7 HARV. J.
LEoIs. 37, 39 (1969).
23. Luria, The Accumulated Earnings Tax, 76 YALE L.J. 793, 794 (1967). See
also Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2 (1959) (examples of reasonable and unreasonable grounds
for accumulations).
24. FORM 1
Co. A Co. B Co. C
(1) Current Assets $1,700,000 $1,700,000 $2,700,000
(2) Current Liabilities 1,600,000 600,000 600,000
(3) Net Liquid Assets $ 100,000 $1,100,000 $2,100,000
(4) Net Liquid Assets
(Line 3) 100,000 1,100,000 2,100,000
(5) Subtract:
(1) operating expenses
during the cycle 490,000 490,000 490,000
(2) anticipated extra-
ordinary expenses 500,000 500,000 500,000
(6) Excess (or shortage) of
working capital $(890,000) $ 110,000 $1,110,000
[Vol. 521182
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achieved depending on variations in the reasonable needs and liquid
position of the business. As the reasonable needs increase, the amount
(7) Earnings and Profits
accumulated at end of
prior year
(8) Earnings and Profits
accumulated at end of
current year
(9) Increase in earnings























$ 600,000 $ 390,000 $ -0-
If the unreasonable accumulation exceeds the increase in the earnings and profits
for the year, then the corporation is entitled to no accumulated earnings credit. When
the unreasonable accumulation is less than the earnings and profits for the year, then
the accumulated earnings credit is the difference between the earnings and profits and




(1) Less Business deductions
(2) Net Profit from Operations
(3) Dividends Received
(4) Less Dividends Received deduction
(5) Net Long-term capital gain
(6) Net Short-term capital loss (includes
$5,000 capital loss carry forward)
(7) Total Income
(8) Charitable deduction (contribution of $60,000)
5% of $1,020,000 (Line 7 plus Line 4)
(9) Taxable Income
(10) Corporate Income Tax (based on 1965 rates)
22% of $25,000
48% of 754,000
















(11) Taxable Income (Line 9) 799,000
(12) Plus: Dividend Received Deduction (Line 4) 170,000
(13) Less: Nondeductible contributions 9,000
Federal income taxes accrued 372,420
Excess of net long-term capital
gains over net short-term
$ 372,420
969,000
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of the credit will increase to reduce the accumulated taxable income.
As the liquidity (the excess of current assets over current liabilities)
of the corporation increases, the amount of the accumulated earnings
credit is reduced.
Since the area of extraordinary needs has been well covered in
the literature,2 5 this comment will focus principally on the problems of
computing the current operational needs of a business. Currently,
the courts, the Treasury, and taxpayers seem to rely on the "operating
cycle" computation approach, which was introduced by Bardahl Manu-
facturing Corp.2 in 1965. An attempt will be made to identify the
strengths and limitations inherent in this formula, and certain refine-
capital loss (excluding capital
loss carry-over)
(40,000 less 15,000) 25,000
less: tax on such excess
(including capital loss
carry-over) (25%
of 20,000) 5,000 20,000 401,420
(14) Net 567,580
(15) Less: Dividends paid deduction
(§§ 561 & 563(a), (c))
Paid during last 91/ mos. of yr. 15,000
Paid during first 2% mos. of next yr. 8,000 23,000
(16) Net $ 544,580
Co. A Co. B Co. C
(17) Accumulated Earnings
Credit (§ 535(c))
(Form 1, Line 11) 600,000 390,000 -0-
(18) Less: Excess of net long-
term capital gain over
net short-term capital
loss 20,000 20,000 20,000
(19) Net 580,000 370,000 -0-
(20) Accumulated Taxable
Income (Line 16 less
Line 19) $ -0- $ 174,580 $ 544,580
(21) Accumulated Earnings Tax
27%,7 of 100,000 -0- 27,500.00 27,500.00
38/2% of balance -0- 28,713.30 171,163.30
Total Tax $ -0- $ 56,213.30 $ 198,663.30
25. See, e.g., S. WErrHom & R. NOALL, supra note 22; Altman, Improper Accumu-
lation of Earned Surplus: Circumstances Which Invoke the Section 531 Penalty Tax:
Business Needs; Purpose to Avoid Surtax; Multiple Corporations and Section 531,
N.Y.U. 24TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 805 (1966); Libin, Accumulations After Bardahi;
Developments Affecting the Accumulated Earnings Tax, N.Y.U. 30TmI INST. ON FED. TAX.
1143 (1972); Skinner, Reasonable Needs of the Business, 17 W. REs. L. REV. 737
(1966); Comment-Accumulated Earnings and The Reasonableness Test of Section 537,
43 TUL. L. REV. 129 (1968).
26. Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123 (1965).
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ments will be suggested that may be usefully adopted in applying the
formula.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CYCLE APPROACH
The search for a method of computing the reasonable daily opera-
tional needs of a business has perplexed the courts since the inception
of the penalty tax in 19 13. The commentators, taxpayers, and courts
have advanced several tentative approaches, none of which has re-
ceived universal acceptance. The struggle has been to discover some
guide or standard by which those needs can be accurately determined.
As a by-product of this effort, the courts had developed prior to 1965
several rules of thumb to aid them in this determination. During this
period the few successful applications of a rule of thumb could be at-
tributed to the facility of application of the "rule" and the ability of
these "rules" to meet the individual characteristics and needs of the
business under attack by the Commissioner.28
One of the earliest rules of thumb to gain wide use was the so-
called "current ratio" test.29 The ratio test involves a comparison of
current assets to current liabilities of -the corporation under scrutiny.
The relationship thus obtained had been employed in a variety of ways
by the courts. Several taxpayers had urged that a 2:1 ratio be ac-
knowledged as a justifiable accumulation of working capital,30 while
other taxpayers urged that a 2.5:11 or 3:132 ratio be adopted. How-
ever, the courts have been extremely reluctant to adopt such a rigid
27. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, § IIA(2), 38 Stat. 114. For a history of the penalty
tax see United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969); Cary, Accumulations Be-
yond the Reasonable Needs of the Business, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1282 (1947).
28. See, e.g., J.L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 T.C. 530 (1948) (inventory was
not replaceable due to the war-time situation, thus the accumulation of working capital
to meet the expenses of one year was reasonable).
29. See, e.g., James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir.
1964), affg in part 38 T.C. 643 (1962); Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d
79 (5th Cir. 1961); Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th. Cir. 1958);
Duke Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 400 (D. Conn. 1963); R.C. Tway
Co. v. Gray, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 849 (W.D. Ky. 1956); Southland Indus., Inc., 15 P-
H Tax Ct. Mem. 897 (1946).
30. See, e.g., Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 322 F.2d 576, 579 (5th
Cir. 1963); Sterling Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 313 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'g
8 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5597 (N.D. Ala. 1961); Harry A. Koch Co. v. Vinal, 228 F.
Supp. 782 (D. Neb. 1964).
31. See, e.g., Atlantic Commerce & Shipping Co., 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 463, 472
(1973); John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453 (1965); Walkup Drayage & Ware-
house Co., 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 801, 808 (1945).
32. See, e.g., Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 568 (1965) (3.85:1); F.E.
Watkins Motor Co., 31 T.C. 288, 299 (1958) (3.5:1; 4.0:1).
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test33 since the strict application of a "per se" rule would fail to com-
pensate for the individual characteristics of a business. As a result the
courts have stated on several occasions that the rule of thumb "should
not be given any greater weight than a rule of administrative conven-
ience."
3 4
Although the current ratio test has come under severe attack as a
valid measure of reasonableness, it appears to retain some significance
when used to compare similar firms within an industry.3 5 Thus when a
taxpayer's ratio compares favorably with those of comparable firms,
the courts have tended to scrutinize the needs of the business more
leniently. Despite this lenient attitude, the taxpayer should not sub-
stitute a favorable ratio for a more detailed analysis of the individual
working capital needs of the business.3 6 The prudent taxpayer should
view the current ratio test solely as another tool to impress upon the
court the merits of his case.
3
7
Another rule of thumb that achieved recognition was formulated
in 1948 by the Tax Court in J. L. Goodman Furniture Co.33 The
court permitted the taxpayer to accumulate working capital suffi-
cient ,to meet one year's operating expenses including the cost of goods
sold. The so-called "one year rule' was particularly appropriate to the
facts in that case since the corporation was unable to assure a constant
supply of inventory due to wartime exigencies. Despite taxpayer at-
tempts to apply this 'test as a per se rule, courts, in recognition of its
limitations, have viewed it also only as .a rule of thumb.39 The major
criticism of the "rule" is -that it fails to consider ,the funds generated
33. See, e.g., Carolina Rubber Hose Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1228 (1965);
Faber, Practitioner's guide to defending a 531 case: theory and practice, 27 J. TX.
274 (1967).
34. Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566, 587 (1965).
35. E.g., Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958);
Lewis Food Co. v. United States, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1310 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Federal
Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co., 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 414 (1969); see S. WmITHORN
& R. NOALL, supra note 22, at 69; Altman, supra note 25, at 821.
36. Faber, supra note 33, at 274."
37. See,' e.g., Churchill Constr. Co. v. United States, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 45
(N.D. Ohio 1965); Federal Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co., 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 414
(1969). The use of current ratios may still retain validity in other ways. "High or
increasing ratios . . . indicate that there exists an accumulation of earnings and profits
which is unrelated to business needs. Conversely, low or decreasing . . . ratios indicate
that there is a business need for the accumulations." Churchill Constr. Co. v. United
States, supra at 48.
38. 11 T.C. 530 (1948). See also Havens & Martin, Inc. v. United States, 15 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 1140 (E.D. Va. 1965).
39. See, e.g., United States v. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 342 F.2d 198 (10th
Cir. 1965); Dixie, Inc. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1960).
1186 (Vol. 52
1974] ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX 1187
-through -the normal operations of the business and thus available to meet
current operational expenses.40 In an attempt -to meet this limitation,
the courts began to modify -and then erode this rule. Subsequent modi-
fications by -the courts have included: (1) an exclusion of the cost of
goods sold41 and (2) an inclusion of only the excess of the cost of
goods sold over -the cash generated from operations.42 In addition, it has
been contended that the rule should -apply where surplus is less than
three-fourths, or in the alternative, two-thirds, of operating costs, 48 or
that it should apply to at least six months,' two months, 45 or thirty-seven
days4" of operating expenses. However, in Dixie, Inc. v. Commissioner47
the Second Circuit, by refusing to apply the "one year rule" even as a
rule of thumb, has so seriously eroded the rule and its suggested modifi-
cations that its present validity is open to serious question.
In an effort to meet the obvious deficiencies of the "one year rule,"
an operating cycle approach was proposed in Bardahl Manufacturing
Corp.48 The operating cycle may be described as the time it takes a
manufacturing business to convert cash into raw materials, raw mate-
rials into inventory, then to convert inventory into accounts ireceivable,
and to convert accounts receivable back to cash. 49 This new objective
40. See United States v. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 342 F.2d 198 (10th Cir.
1965); Hamel, supra note 22, at 49; Zeigler, The "New" Accumulated Earnings Tax:
A Survey of Recent Developments, 22 TAX L. Rav. 77, 92 (1966).
41. Walker v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 865
(1966).
42. United States v. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 342 F.2d 198 (10th Cir.
1965). The court commented that including cost of goods sold as an expense for the
year precluded proper consideration of the funds generated from sales during the course
of the year.
43. James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964); Sterling
Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 313 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1963); Bremerton Sun Publishing
Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965); John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453 (1965).
44. See Glenside, Inc., 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 904, 906 (1953); Boughner, Careful
planning prevents serious accumulated earnings problems, 15 J. TAx. 74 (1961).
45. Thomas S. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 660 (1953).
46. Lewis Food Co. v. United States, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1310 (S.D. Cal.
1964).
47. 277 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1960). See also United States v. McNally Pittsburg
Mfg. Corp., 342 F.2d 198 (10th Cir. 1965); Coastal Casting Serv., Inc. v. Phinney, 26
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5865 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Atlantic Commerce & Shipping Co., 42 P-
H Tax Ct. Mem. 463 (1973); Magic Mart, Inc., 51 T.C. 775 (1969).
48. 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123 (1965). B ardahl was only the culmination of
a trend toward this type of analysis -that started several years earlier. See Barrow Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961); Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1960); Harrison Bolt & Nut Co. v. United States,
14 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5360 (D. Md. 1964).
49. "For a trading business, such as a wholesaler or retailer, the cycle would be
the average period of time in which the corporation converts: (a) cash into the product
to be resold; (b) product inventory into sales and accounts receivable; and (c) accounts
receivable into cash." S. WErrHomr & R. NoAIL, supra note 22, at 71 n.2.
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formula was urged upon the court by both the Commissioner and the
taxpayer and was subsequently accepted as a useful method of comput-
ing the operational needs of the business. Even though the operating
cycle is not a new concept" and previously had been utilized by the In-
ternal Revenue Service, it apparently had never been argued in the
courts prior to Bardahl5 1  The rule of thumb adopted in Goodman
failed to recognize that cash will be generated by the operation of most
businesses during the year and that this cash will then be available to
meet current operational expenses. In contrast, the operating cycle ap-
proach recognizes this fact while also recognizing that there are periods
of time, unique for each business, during which cash will be tied up in
the operation of the enterprise and therefore unavailable for current
needs.
Under Bardahl a corporation should be entitled to retain a work-
ing capital reserve sufficient to carry it through one operating cycle.
The operating cycle is computed as follows:
Step I: A corporation's peak inventory balance5 2 during the year
is divided by the cost of goods sold for the year and then multiplied by
365 to determine the number of days needed to convert raw materials
into inventory. That figure is the inventory turnover rate.
Step JI: A corporation's peak balance of accounts receivable"
for the year is divided by sales for the year and then multiplied by 365
to arrive at the number of days necessary to convert accounts receivable
into cash. That figure is the receivables turnover rate.
Step III: The inventory turnover rate is added to the receivables
turnover rate in order to obtain the number of days in one operating
cycle.
Step IV: The amount of working capital reserve necessary to
carry the corporation through one operating cycle is determined by the
following formula: the cost of goods sold plus its operating expenses
(less depreciation and federal income taxes) for a year is multiplied
50. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, RESTATEMENT AND
REvIsIoN OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS (Accounting Research Bull. No. 43,
1953).
51. Trethewey, Effective use of statistical analysis to fend off 531 attacks, 30 J.
Tax. 80 (1969).
52. There appears to be some controversy as to whether Bardahl used peak or av-
erage figures in its computation. See Trethewey, Justifying Retention of Cash to Meet
Working Capital Needs: The Problem of Section 531, N.Y.U. 27TH INsT. ON FED. TAX.
737, 745 (1968) (peak); Zeigler, supra note 40, at 93-95 (average). The utility of
this distinction is discussed at note 156 infra.
53. Trethewey, supra note 52, at 745; Zeigler, supra note 40, at 95-97.
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by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of days in the oper-
ating cycle and the denominator of which is 365.54
Through the use of the operating cycle approach, it is theoretically
possible to determine the exact amount of working capital needed to
finance a going concern through its daily operations. However, a ma-
jor difficulty with this approach stems from the fact that cycles are
continuously taking place, and therefore at any given time, there will
be many cycles in different stages of completion. 5  The aim of the
Bardahl approach is to find the greatest length of time for which the
greatest amount of capital is invested in the working operations of the
business. The search, therefore, is for that cycle among the many
cycles of the year that will generate the greatest need for cash or liquid
assets.15
Although Bardahl was only a memorandum decision of the Tax
Court, the operating cycle it adopted has been widely recognized in
subsequent decisions. For example, the First Circuit in Apollo In-
54. The Bardahl formula is computed as follows:
Step 1: Determine Business operating cycle:
Material inventory turnover cycle
Cost of materials used
Average of beginning and ending inventories
Percentage material inventory turned over per year
Months per material inventory turnover (12 x 10%)
Receivables conversion cycle
Net sales
Trade receivables at end of year
Percentage of year's sales uncollected
Average number of months' sales uncollected (25%
Operating Cycle
Total months (1.2 plus 3)
Total percentage for year (10% plus 25%)
Step 2: Determine annual operating costs-excluding
depreciation and federal income taxes:
Cost of sales
Expenses (other than federal income taxes)
Less: depreciation
Annual operating expenses
Step 3: Determine ordinary operating expenses during
















Operating cycle percentage 35%
Annual operating expenses $1,400,000
Cycle operating needs $ 490,000
Horvitz, "Operating cycle" test provides needed guidelines for measuring 531 accumula-
tions, 24 J. TAx. 326, 328 (1966).
55. Trethewey, supra note 51, at 80.
56. Id.
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dustries, Inc. v. Commissioner7 reversed a section 531 decision of the
Tax Court, finding that in this instance the lower court had failed to
analyze adequately the working capital needs of the corporation. Al-
though the court of appeals cited the Bardahl decison with approval, it
adopted an operating cycle formula that differed substantially from the
Bardahl formula despite the court's declaration that its analysis was
similar to Bardahl.55 Rather than combining the inventory cycle and
the accounts receivable cycle and multiplying the total against the total
annual expenses as was done in Bardahl, the Apollo court separately
found the "costs" of the inventory cycle (the cost of materials multiplied
by the inventory turnover rate) and added it to the operating "costs" of
an accounts receivable cycle (operating expenses multiplied by the re-
ceivables turnover rate).5 9 The approach suggested by the Apollo
court will lead to a result more favorable to the Commissioner when
applied to the same facts as a Bardahl formula. 0
57. 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966).
58. Id. at 871. Several commentators have tried to explain the deviation from
Bardahl on the grounds that the court did not have sufficient information to make a
Bardahl computation. See, e.g., Trethewey, supra note 52, at 747.
59. 358 F.2d at 872. The court used costs of materials rather than costs of goods
sold as labor and overhead expenses were minor; see, e.g., Zeigler, supra note 40, at
97.
60. An example of the Apollo formula and a comparison of the Bardahl and
Apollo formulas are reproduced below:
The Apollo Formula:
Step I: Cost of material tied up for inventory period:
Annual costs cf materials $ 800,000
Average of beginning and ending material inventories 80,000
Turnover frequency 10 times/year
Days of cost of materials in inventory 36.5 days
Average daily costs of materials (800,000 + 365) $ 2,191.78
Days' cost of materials tied up in inventory (36.5 x $2,191.78) $ 80,000
Step HI: Operating costs during collection period:
Annual net sales $2,400,000
1 day's sales ($2,400,000 -- 365) 6,575.34
Accounts receivable 600,000
Days' sales tied up in accounts receivable
($600,000 - $6,575.34) 91.25 days
Annual operating cos!s (excluding depreciation
and amortization) 1,400,000
Daily operating costs tied up in accounts
receivable (91.25 x $3,835.62) 350,000
Step M: Operating cycle costs (working capital needs):
Materials costs 80,000
Operating costs during collection period 350,000
Working capital needs 430,000
Comparisons of Bardahl and Apollo formulas:
Compare Bardahl formula working capital needs determination: $490,000
with Apollo formula working capital needs determination: $430,000
Alowmnc is lees under Apollo formula by 60,000
1974] ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX 1191
Under the Apollo approach, no operating costs are allocated to the
inventory cycle, and no materials purchases are allocated to the collec-
tion cycle. The fallacy in this approach lies in the fact that a corpora-
tion will certainly incur operating costs during its manufacturing or in-
ventory cycle and, similarly, will incur the expense of merchandise or
raw materials during the receivable collection cycle.61 Thus the view
of the court would appear to ignore the fact that every business is a
"going concern" and as a result will have inventory and receivable
cycles in varying stages of completion throughout the year. It has been
suggested that the Apollo court was aware of its deviation from Bardahl
since it emphasized that its formula need not be used by the Tax Court
on remand so long as the approach used "is set forth with clarity and is
responsive to the realistic needs of a functioning business enterprise."
6 2
The Tax Court in the companion case to Bardahl Manufacturing
Co., Bardahl International Corp.,63 which was decided after Apollo,
apparently accepted the suggestion of the First Circuit that the "Apollo
formula!' need not be utilized. The Tax Court returned to the original
formula adopted in Bardahl Manufacturing without discussing the mer-
its or limitations of either approach. The speedy return to the operat-
ing cycle computation of Bardahl Manufacturing, however, should not
be interpreted to imply that this approach has been readily accepted as
the ultimate test by all the courts or commentators. As was stated in
Delaware Trucking Co. :6 4 "[tjhe single operating cycle (or Bardahl)
method has often been applied, but this court has never held that this
The difference is attributable to the failure of the First Circuit's formula to allow (a)
labor and overhead in inventories ($20,000) and (b) operating expenses (exclusive of
inventory costs) during inventory turnover period ($40,000):
Operating expenses $1,400,000
% inventory turned over per year 10%
Operating expenses during inventory
turnover period (attributable
$80,000 (10%) to material costs,
$20,000 (10%) to other expenses in
cost of sales, and $40,000 (10%) to
other expenses) $140,000
Less materials costs allowed by Apollo 80,000
60,000
Difference $60,000
Horvitz, supra note 54, at 329.
61. Trethewey, supra note 51, at 91; Zeigler, supra note 40, at 98.
62. 358 F.2d at 875 n.14; accord, Magic Mart, Inc., 51 T.C. 775, 794 (1969)
(Government urged an Apollo analysis on the court, but it was rejected).
63. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1051 (1966).
64. 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 110 (1973).
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method has the force of law or should automatically be applied in every
section 531 case .... Likewise, here, the single cycle method, or any
other 'should rise to no higher lever than 'administrative conven-
ience.'-"5 And although the First Circuit remanded Apollo to the
Tax Court for failing to demonstrate its working capital findings ob-
jectively,66 the court cautioned that this cannot be read as an absolute
acceptance of -the Bardahl approach: "We therefore pursue the ap-
proach used in Bardahl, not to sanctify it as applicable in all cases, nor
to substitute our own determination of working capital needs for that
of the Tax Court, but to test the reasonableness of the findings below.1
0 7
The opinion does, however, imply that the court would prefer an oper-
ating cycle test or similar test substituted for the less analytical "rules
of thumb" that have been used in the past.08
II. CRITICISMS OF THE CYCLE APPROACH
The hesitancy of the courts to apply automatically the operating
cycle approach of Bardahl may be in part explained by the courts'
doubts about the reliability of the formula for computing the working
capital needs of particular businesses. Although the courts have not
expressed a basis for distrust of the formula, commentators have been
quick to point out several possible inherent weaknesses of the operating
cycle formula.
Both -the Bardahl and Apollo approaohes Utilized an inventory and
accounts receivable turnover computation. The turnover rate for com-
puting the inventory cycle is obtained by dividing the cost of goods
sold by the inventory, while the turnover rate for the accounts re-
ceivable cycle is obtained by dividing the net sales by the accounts re-
ceivable. If a corporation expects to increase its inventory 'balance or
its accounts receivable balance, this will result in a lower turnover rate
but will increase the number of days in the cycle. As a result there
will be an increase in the amount of the working capital reserve that
can be accumulated safely. At least one commentator has suggested
that since the figures from which these turnover rates are derived are
in many cases taken without analysis from the books of the offending
corporation, these figures may be susceptible of manipulation.00 He
suggests that with respect to inventories, "a corporation which is in a
65. Id. at 119; accord, Walton Mill, Inc., 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 77 (1972).
66. Accord, Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205, 213 (6th Cir.
1968).
67. 358 F.2d at 872.
68. See Horvitz, supra note 54, at 329.
69. Hamel, supra note 22, at 57,
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position to accumulate wealth is likely to be able to increase its average
inventories, at least if it deals in a relatively stable market."70  As to
the possibility of manipulation of receivables, he has suggested that at
least where collection is assured, there may be a relaxation of collection
policies. 71  This would have the effect of lengthening the collection
cycle. He also suggested that not only is the rate susceptible of manip-
ulation, but also the expenses against which this rate is applied may be
inflated in order to allow a more favorable accumulation. The possibil-
ity of inflating salaries as a means of increasing these costs has been
pointed out as one means of manipulating the formula.
7
1
Since the definition of a "reasonable business need" is imprecise
and therefore subject to varying degrees of manipulation by the wary
taxplanner, it is understandable why the cycle formula has been criti-
cized. In Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner,73 the Fourth
Circuit stated that "to the extent the surplus has been translated into
plant expansion, increased receivables, enlarged inventories, or other
assets related to its business, -the corporation may accumulate surplus
with impunity."7 4 However, subsequently in Sears Oil Co. v. Commis-
sioner 5 the court indicated that there exists a limitation on such ac-
cumulations: "It is somewhat of an oversimplification to say as a gen-
erality that to the extent that surplus has been translated into inventory
or other assets related to the business, 'the corporation may accumulate
surplus with impunity.'. . . The inventory must be needed in the bus-
iness; to the extent that it is not, it cannot be accumulated with im-
punity.""7  Apparently, where inventory and possible accounts receiv-
able are found to be accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the
business, the court may be willing to entertain the suggestion that only
that accumulation which it finds to be reasonable will be used in the
operating formula.77  Only in an extreme case of manipulation, how-
70. Id.
71. This is to say that, in those instances where a corporation has extended credit
and is reasonably certain that these debts will be repaid, the corporation may decide
to allow its debtors a longer period of time in which to repay. This would, of course,
have the effect of increasing the accounts receivable balance.
72. Id.; accord, Sullivan, Planning to Avoid the Section 531 Tax, 17 W. RES. L.
REv. 763 (1966).
73. 274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1960).
74. Id. at 501; see American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. United States, 29 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 1301 (D. Md. 1972); Carolina Rubber Hose Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1268,
1280 (1965).
75. 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966).
76. Id. at 196-97.
77. See text accompanying note 193 infra for the same discussion in another con-
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ever, will the court be likely to deviate from the balance sheet presen-
tation of the business assets. To do so would be to substitute the
court's judgment for the judgment of the corporate directors,7 8 an ap-
proach highly unfavored by the courts. Therefore, criticisms of the
Bardahl test should not be construed as an attack on the viability of
the Bardahl operating cycle approach but rather as a comment on the
vagueness of the term "reasonable needs" of the business.
Another objection to the operating cycle is that it fails to take into
account such business risk factors as growth, increased expenses, in-
creased competition, increased sales, and other unknown events of the
marketplace which are not readily reducible to a numerical figure. 79
In utilizing the operating cycle 'approach, the corporation is able to meas-
ure the actual 'working capital required to carry the business through
one complete business cycle. However, it must be kept in mind that
this is a measurement of only the minimum working capital require-
ment.80 The statutory test under section 531 is one of "reasonable-
ness," and thus a businessman should be allowed to maintain a cushion
over and above this minimum. This would give the corporation lee-
way to accumulate reserves for unexpected contingencies or risk ele-
ments of the business. One author found that, while some courts have
recognized this fact in the course of their general discussions, they have
all too often failed in their specific determinations to make allowances
for anything over and above specifically identifiable needs.8 '
It has been suggested that in order to cure this deficiency in the
operating cycle approach, projected figures for sales, cost of goods sold,
inventory, and receivables should be utilized instead of the figures for
the taxable year in question. 2  The viability of this argument will be
discussed in conjunction with refinements of the cycle approach later in
the text8 3
It has also been proposed that the Internal Revenue Service adopt
as a part of its rule-making powers an allowance for the retention of
an amount equal to "'(a) 120 percent, for example, of that determined
78. See, e.g., Barrett Hamilton, Inc. v. United States, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5612
(E.D. Ark. 1959); Eastern Mach. Co., 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 953 (1951).
79. S. WErrHomR & R. NoALL, supra note 22, at 81; Faber, supra note 33, at 257;
Hamel, supra note 22, at 58; Trethewey, supra note 52, at 748; Zeigler, supra note 40,
at 82.
80. Trethewey, supra note 51, at 84.
81. Faber, supra note 33, at 275.
82. Zeigler, supra note 40, at 102; see, e.g., Bardahl Int'l Corp., 35 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1051 (1966).
83. See Part IV inIra.
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under the operating cycle formulas, plus (b) the amount of its current-
liabilities.' "814 Such an approach could create a "safe harbor" for a tax-
payer. However, this proposal has been received with some reservation
since it is without any greater analytical basis than the Goodman rule or
any of the other "rules of thumb."8 5 Both the "projected figures" ap-
proach and the "120 percent rule" are expressions of the idea that each
business has its own individual needs and problems. A strict cycle ap-
proach may "operate with an unnatural precision 8 6 that may not be
attuned to the real world. Thus commentators seek to compensate for
this false precision by allowing a reserve in the form of (1) a twenty
percent leeway over the computed working capital needs or (2) giving
the directors some discretion by allowing them to meet their unexpected
risks through the use of projected operational expenses and income.Y7
It has also been pointed out that the Bardahl formula fails to rec-
ognize the actual timing of expenses and income during the year.88
The formula presupposes that income as well as expenses will be re-
ceived ratably during the year. This in fact is rarely the case. To the
extent that the income of the business is not ratably received over the
year, the operating cycle will adjust itself through the mechanism of
the collection cycle in order to prevent any distortion from occurring. 9
Thus if income is slow coming in, the collection cycle will be length-
ened, and the company will be allowed to accumulate additional work-
ing capital. If the income is collected quickly, then the collection cycle
is shortened, and the company will be allowed to accumulate less.
However, to the extent that the expenses of the business are not
expended uniformly throughout the year, the operating cycle is unable
to adjust itself. 90 For example, in Bardahl International91 the com-
pany incurred large advertising expenses that were contracted for prior
to the beginning of the taxable year and were paid for in a period other
than the peak period. It was suggested to the court that these items
be treated separately from the operational needs of the business. To
do otherwise, the taxpayer argued, will leave the company short of
necessary working capital when all these expenses become due in one
84. S. WErrHORN & R. NoALL, supra note 22, at 81, quoting Zeigler, supra note
40, at 102.
85. See Hamel, supra note 22, at 58.
86. Dielectric Materials Co., 57 T.C. 587, 599 (1972).
87. See note 84 supra.
88. Faber, supra note 33, at 275; Trethewey, supra note 52, at 748.
89. Trethewey, supra note 52, at 748.
90. Id. at 749.
91. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1064.
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period. The trial court refused to accept this argument on the grounds
that by including these expenses in the operating cycle, a substantial
portion of the advertising expenses were being provided for in the work-
ing capital reserve. The view taken by the court toward these unusual
expenses fails to provide the company with sufficient reserves to cover
all the expenses that will be incurred in the cycle in which these un-
usual expenses will have to be paid. In order to solve this problem,
one commentator has suggested that the unusual expense be eliminated
from the operating cycle computation and be treated as an extraordi-
nary need. 2 Alternatively, a system of weighted averages has been sug-
gested "to bring the expenses into uniform application with the cy-
cle. ' 93  By adoption of either of these methods, it is felt that this crit-
icism of the cycle may be met.
The fourth difficulty raised by the commentators centers on the
fact that the cycle allegedly ignores the receipt of income from the
subsequent cycles. 4 Except in the case of a new business, which will
be starting its first cycle, it has been observed that:
In fact, there are many cycles, not just one, and there will be a
continual flow of cash both into and out of the corporation through-
out the measuring period. Amounts received during this period
will be available to finance operating costs and should not be ig-
nored by the courts in determining the taxpayer's resources. The
Bardaht approach does precisely this, however, to the extent that
such amounts are not represented by receivables at the end of the
taxable year (and, hence, are not treated as liquid funds available
to defray the costs of the first measuring period of the next year).93
One commentator has suggested a modification to the Bardahl
formula to meet this deficiency. 96 In Mr. Skinner's estimation, a cor-
poration should be allowed to accumulate assets sufficient to provide
for its maximum "cash cycle" requirements.9 7  The "cash cycle" is de-
92. Trethewey, supra note 51, at 83. See generally Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 680 (1969); Adolph Coors Co., 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mcm. 1477
(1968).
93. Trethewey, supra note 51, at 83. Presumably, the author is referring to a sys-
em where the expenses, which fall due all in one cycle or erratically through the operat-
ing year, are assigned a weighted amount in relation to the other expenses in the cycle
computation in order to assure a sufficient working capital reserve. Such a weighted
amount would increase the expenses to which the operating domicile is applied and result
in a reserve adequate to meet those expenses when they become due.
94. Faber, supra note 33, at 275; Trethewey, supra note 52, at 753-54.
95. Faber, supra note 33, at 275.
96. Skinner, supra note 25, at 744; accord, Monyek, The Growing Problem of Ac-
cumulated Earnings: Section 531 Today, 12 TAXES 761, 767 (1969).
97. Skinner, supra note 25, at 744.
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fined as "the amount of costs and expenses. . . that is likely to be in-
curred during the procurement, production, -and delivery period [in-
ventory period] under which the corporate enterprise operates. Ordi-
narily, it would not include the colleotion period .... *"98 This ration-
ale is based on the premise that there is a constantly recurring accounts
receivable collection cycle that will be continually generating cash for
the corporation.
This approach fails to recognize that cash generated by the col-
lection cycle will not always be available to meet the costs of the cur-
rent production or inventory cycle. Presumably, this cash will be
needed to pay for expenses incurred in the previous production cycles.
However, it has been argued that the prior operating cycles during the
year will generate a profit in most normal situations, a profit that would
be available for future cycles. 99 This profit generated during the year
should supply an extra cushion for the corporation in meeting its fu-
ture operating needs. The courts to date have ignored this additional
cushion in computing the reserve necessary to meet the needs of the
business.
When analyzing a company's operational needs, the crucial view-
point is that of the directors and management immediately prior to the
beginning of the year in which the profits are to be earned. 100 Gen-
erally, management cannot be assured that the following year will be
a profitable one. The fact that the company earned a profit in one
year should not bear on the determination of what reserves will be al-
lowed to meet the operational needs of the business in the future.
Therefore, the profit earned from previous or ongoing cycles should not
be included as another source of funds.10
Although the preceding four criticisms by no means exhaust the
field, they do show that the cycle approach is susceptible to attack.
98. Id. "If, however, the collection cycle of an enterprise is longer than its pro-
curement-production-delivery period, then the cash cycle for that enterprise should take
into account the longer collection period." Id.
99. Trethewey, supra note 52, at 753-54; Zeigler, supra note 40, at 92.
100. Trethewey, supra note 52, at 753-54.
101. C. PARK & J. GLADSON, WORKING CAPITAL 184-87 (1963).
mhe fact that income is realized in an account in excess of expenses does
not mean that cash is available to pay the expenses. For example, the income
may be reflected, in part, by accounts receivables. Moreover, a portion of the
income realized in cash may have been used to buy additional fixed assets
rather than to pay for current deductible expenses. Finally, even assuming that
all income is immediately realized in cash, a reserve must nevertheless be re-
tained to meet expenses in an orderly fashion as they come due. The corpora-
tion cannot wait for a dollar of income to be received in order to pay a dollar
of expenses.
Zeigler, supra note 40, at 92.
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However, by careful analysis and understanding of the problems in-
herent in the cycle approach, many of the objections can be met by
variations or refinements in the application of the formula.
I1. VARIATIONS ON THE CYCLE APPROACH
The legal commentators since Bardahl have suggested new ap-
proaches and variations to the cycle approach. One of the most in-
teresting commentaries to date has agreed with the Bardahl court that
the cycle approach is a proper mode of analysis for the problem. 102
However, while the author found the Bardahl approach "systematio
and reliable,"'01 3 his approach differs in several important respects.
Mr. Luria suggests a computation very similar to Bardahl, but he
differs on the focus of the analysis. Like the Bardahl court, Mr. Luria
uses a production cycle (inventory cycle) and a collection cycle (ac-
counts receivable cycle) in computing the reserves that will be needed
to carry the business through production, sale, and collection. The
production cycle is described as follows:
The volume of costs which mature into expenses during the
gap between production and sale is generally proportional to the
length of the gap. The working capital needed for this gap may
be computed by calculating the average daily production and op-
erating expenses of a corporation, then multiplying by the number
of days between production and sale.10 4
As to collection cycle needs, Mr. Luria finds these to be in a direct re-
lationship to the production cycle, and thus they should be computed
as follows:
Adding a carrying period [for receivables] has the same effect on
the corporation's working capital needs as lengthening the produc-
tion period-as the period is extended, finance needs grow in pro-
portion.
This relationship provides a method of calculating fund needs
due to the extension of credit. One determines the average collec-
tion period for accounts receivable, and compares it with the pro-
duction period. Needs arising from the extension of credit bear the
same relationship to those arising from production . . . as the
carrying period does to the production period.105
102. Luria, supra note 23.
103. Id. at 795.
104. Id. at 796.
105. Id. at 798. "Thus, if production needs amount to $100,000, the production pe-




The analysis adopted by the court in Bardahl concerning the
length of time in an inventory or receivable cycle or turnover is an ob-
jective one. It is based on an historical statistical analysis of the re-
lationship between cost of goods sold and inventory or between sales
and accounts receivable, which, through the use of hindsight of the
current year, shows what the business may need for the following year.
However, Mr. Luria's approach is purely subjective. It requires a study
of the various cycles for the individual business in question, rather than
a statistical analysis, in order to determine the number of days between
production and final sales for cash. This points up an important
problem with this approach because it would be difficult if not impos-
sible for a court to establish criteria that could be uniformly applied for
measuring this period. In addition, the use of a subjective analysis for
the computation of the cycle periods may tend to penalize a business
that fails to retain sophisticated accounting records, and thus would be
unable to compute the number of days in the "gap" with any degree of
certainty.
Mr. Luria proposes a variation to his formula in the case of a
business with seasonal variations in expenses and income. He con-
cludes that a business has an affirmative duty10 6 to predict the pattern
of such items in advance in order to be entitled to additional cash re-
serves to meet these fluctuations.10 7 Again, this subjective approach to
the problem of fluctuations is deficient in several major respects. First,
there are no assurances that a pattern can ever be established for such
expenses and income. For example, in Shaw-Walker Co. v. Com-
missioner'08 the high receivable cycle not only occurred in the same
month, but also before and after the production cycle period in the years
under analysis.' 09 Thus no relationship or pattern could be ascertained.
Secondly, this approach places the business in a position of predicting
what will happen in the future, but nevertheless, if there is a miscalcula-
tion, the subjective approach may result in the imposition of the penalty
tax because "in fact" the taxpayer did not need such a large reserve.
At least with the objective approach, if it is found that the actual needs
are not the same as the statistically computed needs, the corporation
will not be penalized. Apparently aware of the position in which his
subjective approach will place a taxpayer, Mr. Luria suggests that in the
106. Id. at 800.
107. Id. at 801.
108. 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968).
109. Brief for Appellant at 584a, Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205
(6th Cir. 1968).
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event of a miscalculation there is an escape period two and one-half
months after the end of the year in which the company can still pay a
dividend and avoid the penalty tax.110 This reasoning by the author
"squarely brings into focus the disparity between subjectivity and ob-
jectivity in the measurement of working capital.""'
Although the collection cycle formula quoted above initially ap-
pears to differ from the Bardahl formulation, the working capital re-
serve computed under both approaches will be the same." 2 The only
objection -to it is academic. Mr. Luria's formula assumes some relation
between the receivables cycle and the inventory cycle. Thus he makes
the working capital reserve computed under the accounts receivable
cycle bear the same relation to the reserve under the inventory cycle as
the number of days in the receivable cycle bears to the inventory cy-
cle. ' 3  As noted earlier,"4 Shaw-Walker clearly indicates that there is
normally no relationship between the receivable cycle and production
period as a measurement of time. One does not necessarily occur after
the other. The BardahI approach finds the two cycles that will require
the greatest financial investment and combines them. This does not
mean that the two are related, only that since the two are unrelated they
could conceivably occur at the same time, thus requiring a greater cash
reserve than normal.
Another commentary on the Bardahl formula suggests an addi-
tional variation on the cycle approach that upon analysis appears to
be somewhat contradictory. 15 The writer advocates the use of a peak
inventory cycle but feels that the collection cycle should not be included
because "funds from the collection of receivables . . . are being con-
verted into cash and reinvested in inventories."" 0 This approach has
already been suggested by one writer and was criticized previously." 7
However, the author recognizes that this approach creates a problem
110. Luria, supra note 23, at 800 n.13.
111. Trethewey, supra note 51, at 85.
112. If the inventory cycle is one month and the collection or receivables cycle is
two months long then the total expenses will be multiplied by one-fourth of a year to
compute the necessary working capital. Those expenses attributed to the receivable cy-
cle will be twice those in the inventory cycle. This is the same result reached in note
105 supra where the receivable cycle was found to be three times that of the production
cycle. Thus, three times the expenses were allowed to carry the business through this
cycle.
113. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
114. Id.
115. Monyek, supra note 96, at 767.
116. Id.
117. See notes 96-99 and accompanying text supra.
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when the taxpayer's accounts receivable fluctuate significantly during
the year from their "normal balance," thus creating an additional drain
on cash to carry the costs incurred to create these increased receiv-
ables."" To meet this problem, the commentator suggests that one
should add the costs of generating these additional receivables to the
costs of the peak inventory cycle.119 "For example, using . . .a 75
percent cost ratio . . . , a taxpayer having receivables at the balance
sheet date of $1,000,000, expected to increase as of the beginning of
the peak period to $1,500,000 would treat. . . an additional $375,000
as needed to generate and carry the expected increase in receivables."' 20
As a result, it is reasoned that this approach will permit sufficient ac-
cumulations of working capital to cover the expenses of the business
during its most costly inventory cycle as well as any fluctuations in
receivables when that period arises.
The contradiction appears when it is pointed out that the author
has removed the "collection cycle" from the computation but in effect
has compensated for its absence by adding back the costs necessary to
generate an increase in accounts receivable. The theory behind the use
of the collection cycle is that there is a delay in converting a credit
sale into cash.' 21 The business has money invested in the product or
service sold, but due to the extension of credit it has not been able to
convert that investment into cash that can then be used to pay for the
investment. In the meantime, a business will continue to incur addi-
tional expenses as an ongoing business until the receivables are col-
lected. The cycle computation of Bardahl recognized this fact by add-
ing to the inventory cycle a peak collection cycle to represent the time
it takes to finally realize cash on the sale.
When a peak collection cycle is added to the statistical analysis,
it accomplishes two things. First, it compensates for the problem of
increases or fluctuations in the receivable balance during the year, and
secondly, it reflects the idea that to extend credit to a customer ties up a
business' cash reserves. Mr. Monyek recognized that his approach was
deficient in this respect and as a result attempted to compensate for
these fluctuations by adding to the working capital reserve additional
costs necessary to generate the sales that produced the increased or
fluctuating receivables. By doing so, however, he has only attacked
118. Monyek, supra note 96, at 770.
119. Id. at 770-71.
120. Id.
121. Luria, supra note 23, at 798.
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half the problem. What of the costs incurred that are now represented
by the "other" receivables, not just the receivables that fluctuate over
the norm? It would appear that Mr. Monyek has ignored the fact that
it is expensive for a business to extend credit to customers even if the
level of such credit is constant and does not fluctuate. To justify this
result he argues that since cash is being generated by other collection
cycles, this cash is available as a source of additional funds for the
business. As noted earlier, 12 2 this argument ignores the fact that there
are also at any one time numerous production cycles in progress or
about to begin. These cycles along with the "extraordinary needs"
most businesses incur will generally utilize this cash. 123  As a result,
there is usually no additional source of funds that can be counted on by
the business to finance the credit represented by its receivables. This
fact is aptly shown by the common practice in business of factoring re-
ceivables through financial institutions.
The courts also have readily accepted the challenge of formulat-
ing variations to the cycle approach. An early method suggested by
the Tax Court to determine whether accumulations met the test of rea-
sonableness was formulated in National Yarn Corp. 24 The taxpayer
had accumulated at the end of the year under examination 499,000
dollars worth of liquid assets exclusive of receivables and inventory.
The court restricted its analysis to the reasonableness of this accumu-
lation without regard to ,the effect the receivables or inventory might
have had on available working capital. The court held that a taxpayer
should be allowed to deduct from this accumulation a sum equal to one
year's operating expenses exclusive of materials purchased. 26 In ad-
dition, a deduction was allowed for cash needed to increase the inven-
tory balance to normal levels as well as for other "extraordinary needs"
found by the court. Current liabilities were then deducted from this
excess cash figure to yield the excess or deficiency in working cap-
ital.126
The most striking departure between this formulation and the cur-
rent method employed under Bardahl is the analysis of the "cash assets"
without regard to "other" current assets. Therefore, this "formula"
122. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
123. See, e.g., Zeigler, supra note 40, at 92, quoted in note 101 supra.
124. 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 551 (1950).
125. As this case was brought during the heyday of the now defunct Goodman rule,
the present deduction allowable under the court's reasoning should be ordinary operating
cycle expenses less cost of materials.
126. 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 557-58; see Horvitz, supra note 54, at 332 n.22.
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may be interpreted by some as an -attempt to equalize the position of
those corporations which pay off their current liabilities at year end with
those corporations which carry these liabilities forward into the next
year.127 The facts of the particular case, however, belie this reasoning
and indicate that the court was most concerned with making proper
provisions for the exigencies facing the particular taxpayer. The tax-
able year in question was 1944, during the severest part of the war,
when inventory and accounts receivable were sharply reduced. 128  The
court probably determined that these assets, which were at an unusually
and undesirably low level, were not available to meet current operating
expenses or current liabilities without severe hardship to the continu-
ance of the business. Therefore, they were not to be included in the
accumulation the reasonableness of which was to be tested. 29
The National Yarn computation is unlikely to be a viable alter-
native to the sophisticated operating cycle approach due to its age and
the readily distinguishable facts on which it was promulgated. How-
ever, it should remain useful for the premise that reasonableness is a
vague standard peculiar to each taxpayer, and that any formulation
should be closely scrutinized when the particular facts seem 'to warrant
a highly individual analysis.
In 1964 the Second Circuit, in Electric Regulator Corp. v. Com-
missioner,8 0 adopted yet another means of determining the reasonable-
ness of an accumulation. The court, taking the case on appeal by the
taxpayer from an adverse judgment in the Tax Court, focused on the
ability of the taxpayer to pay the dividends that the lower court deter-
mined the taxpayer should have paid.' 3' The court, therefore, changed
its focus from the reasonableness of ithe accumulation to the reasonable-
ness of the dividends suggested.
The court's review focused on the source of these suggested div-
idends. The Tax Court had based its finding of an ability to pay div-
idends on the total accumulated earnings of the corporation. The Sec-
ond Circuit rejected the use of accumulated earnings as a source of
dividends when an analysis had not been made of the use to which
these earnings had been put.' 3 2 The court reasoned that such earnings
127. Horvitz, supra note 54, at 332.
128. 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 558.
129. Id. .
130. 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964).
131. Id. at 344-46.
132. Id. at 343-44.
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were not a readily available source of liquid funds with whioh to sat-
isfy corporate obligations and pay dividends. This reasoning was based
on the belief that earnings had been translated into a cross section of
assets many of which were reasonable and necessary to the business
and therefore not in a position to be paid out to meet expenses.'" 8 The
taxpayer argued, and the Second Circuit agreed, that only the cash ac-
count should be considered. A determination was to be made whether
the corporation was in a liquid position to pay dividends. The court
believed that cash, and presumably marketable securities, were the only
assets that may not be reasonably accumulated to the extent that they
were not applied to the reasonable needs of the business. Further.
these assets were the only ones available to meet expenses of the busi-
ness and to pay dividends.
The formula derived from this analysis begins with the cash bal-
ance at the end of the year in question. Current liabilities are sub-
tracted to yield cash available. To this figure is added the net income
for the following year to obtain the net cash available. Then antici-
pated, extraordinary expenses are subtracted to yield cash available to
pay dividends. 13 4  It should be noted that the amount of dividends
which ,the Tax Court determined should have been paid by the corpo-
ration would have created a cash deficit. The Second Circuit noted
this fact and reversed, yet the court never attempted to determine what
dividends could have been paid without adversely affecting the cash bal-
ance needed by -the business.
The court's reasoning with respect to retained earnings is entirely
sound and will be discussed below. 135  However, the approach ad-
vanced is one entirely based on hindsight since it looks to the net in-
come for the following year. 3 6 The court made no analysis of funds
available in the current year. As such this approach has no utility as
a planning device or as an objective measure of evaluating accumula-
tions at year end. Thus, to the extent the approach uses figures that
133. Id. at 344.
134. Id. at 345. See also Horvitz, supra note 54, at 330. An earlier case provid-
ing a variant of the same approach is Barrett Hamilton, Inc. v. United States, 4 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 5612 (E.D. Ark. 1959). In that case the court considered current assets
exclusive of building fund assets and inventory from 'which it subtracted current liabili-
ties plus need for increase in inventory to arrive at an asset balance available for other
(dividend) purposes. Against this figure the court compared the 3 year total of divi-
dends urged by Commissioner to be paid. This comparison yielded a potential cash
deficit so that the judgment was rendered for the taxpayer. If inventory had been in-
cluded in current assets a substantially different result would have obtained.
135. See text accompanying note 190 infra.
136. Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 1964).
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are unknown to the taxpayer at the end of the year under attack, it
may severely penalize the corporation if such figures exceed the figures
projected by the taxpayer when the decision was made not to pay div-
idends, regardless of how reasonable the decision was at that time.
Although the approach is unsound as a means of objectively eval-
uating accumulations, it may have some continuing validity as a means
of testing the Commissioner's determination of reasonableness. The
facts of Electric Regulator indicate that the court devised the test to
determine whether the taxpayer actually could have paid the dividends
that the Commissioner determined the corporation should have paid. 37
For this purpose it may remain a useful tool of the court but should
rise to no higher level.
The suggested alternative formulas discussed above do not appear
to be better solutions to the problem of determining the reason-
able needs of the business than the Bardahl approach. In fact they
often appear to be of less viability. However, there should be nothing
to forestall a taxpayer from urging them or even an original formula-
tion on the court when the circumstances appear to lend themselves to
such an argument.
IV. REFINEMENTS ON THE CYCLE APPROACH
A. Operating Costs: Current or Projected
Since the current year's working capital reserve for the operational
needs of the business is accumulated to meet the expenses to be in-
curred in the following year, a controversy has arisen over whether the
costs and expenses to be used in the cycle analysis should be the ex-
penses of the current year, those projected for the following year, or
some other measure. The controversy is yet to be resolved.
The controversy over when to measure the costs and expenses of
the business for the purpose of the operational cycle first arose in Bar-
dahI Manufacturing'38 and Bardahl International.3 ' The court in
Bardahl Manufacturing used the costs and expenses of the current year
in computing the reasonable working capital reserve for the end of that
year. The First Circuit in Apollo, 40 following BardahI, also utilized
137. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
138. Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123 (1965).
139. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1051 (1966); see New England
Woodenware Corp. v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 111 (D. Mass. 1968).
140. Apollo Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966), remanding
44 T.C. 1 (1965).
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the current cost approach. However, in Bardahl International the
court computed the working capital needs by using actual expenses for
the subsequent year. This change in approach is not discussed in the
Bardahl International opinion, but it may be explained on the ground
that in the previous decisions only the current costs approach was urged
on the court.
The argument for the projected cost approach is based on the
premise that only by the use of projected expense figures will a growing
company have sufficient working capital to finance its operations for
the following year. "Current cost" computations do not provide a
cushion for overall growth of the company or inflationary increases in
expenses. Likewise, for a company that is undergoing a financial con-
traction, the use of current costs rather than the lower projected figures
would create an excess of working capital.
The real objection to the use of projected figures is that there is
no accurate and reliable method available that would not be subject
to abuse. This fact may explain why BardahI International used the
actual expenses in the following year rather than projected figures for
that year. Although this approach may be criticized on the ground that
it allows the court to use a hindsight test, which is generally condemned
in a "reasonable needs" analysis,' 41 it would tend to cure the inherent
defect in using projected figures. If the court takes into account actual
expenses when asked to decide an accumulated earnings tax case, the
court is in a good position to determine the reasonableness of the pro-
jected expense figures which were relied upon by the taxpayer when he
decided to accumulate working capital rather than distribute it.14 2
One of the most interesting approaches to the "projected cost"
variation of the operating cycle computation of Bardahl Manufacturing
is found in the recent case of Delaware Trucking Co.143 In that case
the taxpayer, faced with increasing expenses due to inflation and labor
demands, successfully argued that it should be allowed to retain "work-
ing capital as of the end of each of the taxable years involved at least
in an amount sufficient to cover its reasonably anticipated costs of oper-
ating for a single operating cycle, plus an additional amount approxi-
141. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b)(2) (1972); S. WEITHoN & R. NOALL,
supra note 22, at 49; Hamel, supra note 22, at 40.
142. Some writers suggest that the use of hindsight analysis should be limited to
determining the "intent" of the taxpayer and not the "reasonableness" of the need. S.
WErro RN & R. NOA.L, supra note 22, at 49. However, where an abuse is alleged it
may constitute a proper measuring stick of the reasonableness of the need.
143. 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem, 110 (1973).
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mately seventy-five percent thereof. 14 4  The court compared the ex-
penses incurred in the current year with those in a prior year and found
a substantial increase. As a result, 'the court reasoned that such an
increase in expenses could be reasonably expected -in future periods,
and thus the taxpayer should be allowed to accumulate sufficient work-
ing capital to meet these increased costs. 145 By examining the growth
of -the business and the rate of inflation over a period of time, a reason-
able projection of future increases in costs arguably can be made.
Since the cases that use the "current cost" approach can be ex-
plained on the ground that the litigants failed to argue to the court
the theory of projected costs or to supply the court with sufficient in-
formation to make such computations, it is not surprising -that the court
adopted the easiest method in computing the costs of the business.
The better approach would appear to be the projected cost theory, a
theory that the courts are likely to accept upon reflection since it af-
fords a more realistic approach to the question of what are the reason-
able operational needs of the business.
B. Peak or Average Cycles
As has been noted above,146 the court in Bardahl Manufacturing
used the peak balances for inventory and accounts receivable in com-
puting the operating cycle.' 47  However, it has been urged that aver-
age levels provide a sufficient measure of working capital needs.' 4 8
The importance of utilizing peak or average levels is evident to a tax-
payer whose business undergoes fluctuations in its inventory and ac-
counts receivable balances over the year. A computation of working
capital needs based on average turnover rates is almost certain to be
inadequate to carry the business through a period of peak activity.
"Since the ultimate question is how much working capital constitutes
a 'reasonable need of the business,' it seems clear that determining the
amount necessary to cover peak operating needs is entirely appropri-
ate."' -40 This would correspond with the expectations of prudent man-
144. Id. at 113.
145. Id. at 118.
146. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
147. See note 52 supra.
148. C. PARK & J. GLADSON, supra note 101, at 29-32. Even though this book is
concerned with the financial management of publicly held companies by strengthening
internal controls, the analysis is similar. See, e.g., Faber Cement Block Co., 50 T.C.
317, 331 (1968); Luria, supra note 23, at 796.
149. See, e.g., Perfection Foods, Inc., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68, 73 (1965) ("Thus
we recognize that reasonable needs of a business include needs of the business dur-
ing the peak of its operations. . ....
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agement to be able to meet the peak demands of his business rather
than just the average ones.
Although the courts that have accepted the "peak" rationale have
measured the peak balances on the basis of month-end figures, it has
been suggested as a further refinement that the taxpayer utilize a peak
week or even a high day balance within the high month, 1 0 provided
the information is available. The use of a high day or week figure
will allow the taxpayer to compute more accurately the maximum
amount of time funds will be invested in the business not subject to
other use, and therefore, a more accurate reflection of the working cap-
ital needs will be obtained.
If one accepts the validity of the peak cycle approach, a contro-
versy still remains about how the peak period is to be measured. The
focus of this controversy is aptly shown in the case of Kingsbury In-
vestments, Inc.1' 1 in which the court agreed that the peak cycle was
an appropriate measure of time. However, the court refused to ac-
cept the contention of the taxpayer that it should be able to measure
this period based on peak inventory and peak receivables determined
at separate times during the year. The court reasoned that since peak
inventory and peak receivables did not necessarily occur in conjunction
with one another, the use of these figures would yield "an unreason-
ably inflated needs figure.' 15 2  Instead the court made its computation
by using "the month in which the sum of inventory plus accounts re-
ceivables exceeds the sum of those figures for any other month."'"
In contrast, the court in Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co.15 4 indicated
that it considered the proper approach to be a consideration of the peak
inventory and receivables cycles no matter where they may fall during
the year.
In situations where it can be shown that the peak periods can
never occur in conjunction with one another, the Kingsbury approach
probably reaches a proper result. However, as was discussed earlier,'"
there is generally no relationship between the levels of peak receivables
and dnventory. Therefore, it -is theoretically possible for these peak
150. Trethewey, Accumulated Earnings Tax-Working Capital, 187-2d TAX MAN-
AGEMENT PoRTFroLIo A-19 (1971).
151. 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1174 (1969).
152. Id. at 1180 n.4.
153. Id. at 1181 n.4.
154. 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 680 (1969); accord Magic Mart, Inc., 51 T.C. 775,
794 (1969).
155. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
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periods to occur at the same time, thus creating a greater need for
working capital than provided for under the Kingsbury approach. 56
To preserve the principle of allowing the management of the corpora-
tion to accumulate working capital to meet their maximum needs, it
seems proper to allow the taxpayer to compute its peak cycle based
on separate peaks.
C. Credit Cycle
In BardahI International Corp. the Tax Court departed somewhat
from the cycle computation in Bardahl Manufacturing by adding an-
other stage to the analysis. The operating cycle was reduced by the
average period during which accounts payable remained outstanding
and thus were unpaid throughout the year.'15  The argument for this
reduction is based on the theory that if the taxpayer is entitled to delay
payment of its bills, some reduction in working capital, is required. 158
This credit cycle may be computed in one of two ways. One can use
either the average lag period in payment of raw material inventory," 9
which will mean a subjective analysis of the business cycle or the fol-
lowing formula, which eliminates the need for subjective analysis and
the problems inherent in it:' 6
average accounts payable x 365
materials purchased
The time period determined under this computation is subtracted from
the total of the receivables and inventory cycle to determine the net
cycle for the business. This modification of the original Bardahi for-
mula has been the subject of wide controversy.'' However, the better
reasoned view would appear to be that a credit cycle should not be
subtracted from the cycle computation.
When a business pays its creditors promptly, there is no lag be-
tween receipt of raw materials or goods and the payment for the goods.
156. Of course, if a relationship between receivables and inventory can be found,
then it may be proper to pick the "peak month" rather than the "peak periods" and
combine them. The Kingsbury approach would be correct where it was impossible for
the peak inventory and peak receivables to occur at the same time.
157. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1051, 1055 (1966).
158. S. WErrHonN & R. NoALL, supra note 22, at 77; Libin, supra note 25, at 1149;
Zeigler, supra note 40, at 99.
159. Tretheway, supra note 52, at 749.
160. S. WErrHoRN & R. NOALL, supra note 22, at 76; Zeigler, supra note 40, at 99.
161. C. PARK & J. GLADSON, supra note 101, at 30; S. WErrHORN & R. NOALL, supra
note 22, at 76; Monyek, supra note 96, at 768; Trethewey, supra note 150, at A-17 to
-18; Tretbewey, supra note 52, at 750.
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In such a case there is very little justification for -the use of a credit cy-
cle in the operating cycle computations. However, it is conceivable
that the Commissioner could urge such a result just the same. He has
argued in the past that a business with a good credit standing should
finance its operations by borrowing rather than accumulating reserves
to pay for such expenses. 162  Thus the company should take advantage
of the credit extended by its suppliers. The courts when presented
with this argument have uniformly taken the position that "the ac-
cumulated earnings tax provisions cannot be understood to require a
corporation to resort to debt financing rather than operating on a strictly
cash basis, even if this means accumulating considerable liquid as-
sets.' 63
Although most of the courts that have dealt with this attack have
done so in the area of "anticipated future needs," the one case that
has squarely faced the issue in dealing with the operational needs of the
business reached a similar result. In Schenuit Rubber Co. v. United
States6 the court stated that:
[T]he government argues that taxpayer might have borrowed
money for current operations. The Courts, however, have gen-
erally considered a taxpayer's historic policy to finance current op-
erations and expansions with its own funds, and have not penalized
a taxpayer whose experience and bona fide policy justifified self-
financing.
It is apparent that . . . [the government's] figures contemplated
that the Company would keep one step ahead of the sheriff if
everything went right; they would result in prompt insolvency if
anything went wrong.1 5
The decisions above would seem to indicate that a corporation with no
credit cycle is in a very strong position to resist the imposition of one
by the Commissioner. 16 '
162. See, e.g., Walkup Drayage & Warehouse Co., 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 801, 809
(1945) where the court stated: 'The respondent asserts that the petitioner could have
borrowed money to pay a dividend and that 'there is nothing unusual about a corpora-
tion borrowing cash from a bank for use in the making of a dividend distribution and
then borrowing further for the needs of its business.'" Accord, Sears Oil Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 359 F.2d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'g 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 229 (1965);
Mohawk Paper Mills, Inc. v. United States, 262 F. Supp. 365, 372 (N.D.N.Y. 1966);
Fisher Lime & Cement Co. v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5540 (W.D. Tenn.
1963); John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453, 468 (1965).
163. Comment, 43 TtL. L. R.v., supra note 25, at 143 and cases cited therein.
164. 293 F. Supp. 280 (D. Md. 1968).
165. Id. at 290 & n.14.
166. Recent cases indicate that the credit cycle is not a proper element in the op-
erating cycle, since they failed to utilize such an element; see, e.g., Mimmac Corp., 41
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For a business that does utilize the credit extended by it suppliers,
the use of the credit cycle as a part of the statistical analysis would ap-
pear to have some justification. However, the use of the credit cycle
is based on the premise that the credit extended by suppliers will con-
tinue in the future uninterrupted and unchanged. 167  In addition, the
inclusion of a credit cycle mandates that the taxpayer will not have to
pay, and under this approach may well not be able to pay, its sup-
pliers more quickly than it has been paying them in the past.
A taxpayer faced with this problem has several arguments at his
disposal. First, it is unreasonable to lock a taxpayer into a financial
position in which he has to rely on the credit of his suppliers in order
to operate. It is a valid and reasonable business objective to avoid
debt. 1 18 Yet this is exactly what the credit cycle prevents a taxpayer
from doing.
The court in Bardahi International utilized a thirty day credit cy-
cle in computing the operating cycle for the business. The primary
supplier of Bardahl International was the related Bardahl Nanufactur-
ing Co. which extended credit for thirty day periods to International
almost as a matter of right. Thus Bardahi International may be dis-
tinguished on this ground since generally management does not have
any control over the credit policies of its suppliers.1 69 This lack of con-
trol over credit makes continued reliance on the credit of suppliers,
through the use of the credit cycle, a questionable and dangerous prac-
tice at best. However, the use of the credit cycle may have continuing
validity in those instances in which the taxpayer voluntarily chooses to
remain in debt through its control or influence over the credit policies
of its suppliers.
In addition, it would appear-to be well within sound business judg-
ment for a business to refuse to rely on the credit extended by suppliers
and to plan its resources for the worst possible credit picture. Gen-
erally, a court should not disturb such a "business judgment": "We
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 393, 400 n.6 (1972); Magic Mart, Inc., 51 T.C. 775 (1969); Ala-
bama Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 680 (1969); Faber Cement Block
Co., 50 T.C. 317 (1968).
167. Trethewey, supra note 150, at A-18.
168. Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966), where the court
stated: "We do not think taxpayer's ability to finance its business by borrowing by itself
indicates the presence of the prohibited purpose. Section 531 does not bar taxpayer
from endeavoring to reduce its borrowing and to become self-financing." Id. at 196.
169. Trethewey, supra note 150, at A-17. It is also important to note that the court
in Bardahl Int'l Corp., when it utilized the credit cycle, only included the payables to
its related corporation and not third-party payables. Id.
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are not unmindful that in the first instance it is for the corporate of-
ficers and directors to determine the reasonable needs of the particular
business. Consequently, we are reluctant to substitute our business
judgment for that of corporate management . . .. 0 The Commis-
sioner, therefore, should not force a company to continue utilizing the
credit of suppliers if the company wishes to protect its financial stand-
ing from a possible cut-off or tightening of credit.
Paradoxically, the business with the weakest financial picture will
probably have the largest accounts payable and thus the longest credit
cycle. The financially strong business that pays its bills promptly will
have no accounts payable and, therefore, no credit cycle. Thus by the
use of a credit cycle the company in the weaker financial position will
not be allowed to accumulate as much working capital as the company
in the stronger financial position. As a result, the use of a credit cycle




One of the most interesting attacks17 on the use of the credit cy-
cle has centered on a concept, developed in Smoot Sand & Gravel
Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 that every business should be treated as a
"going concern." Every business will incur operational expenses in the
first part of an operational cycle which may not require a working cap-
ital reserve because the payment of those expenses was deferred as a
result of credit extended by suppliers. However, if a business is an on-
going one, it will be faced with the payment of the expenses incurred
at the end of the previous cycle. Thus there will always be an outflow
of cash needed to meet purchases except in the case of a new business
beginning its first production cycle. "Thus, in actuality, the business
has a cash need for the full cycle, partly to finance new production
and sales and partly to cover prior costs, and it ought to receive credit
for all such needs."'
7 4
Even in light of the above analysis, the credit cycle is not without
its proponents. Since the thirty day credit period of most industries
may represent a significant percentage of a corporation's operating cy-
cle, it is felt that the Bardahl formula really cannot be an objective
measure of the needs of the business unless the statistical analysis rec-
170. Faber Cement Block Co., 50 T.C. 317, 326 (1968). See also Barrett Hamil-
ton, Inc. v. United States, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5612, 5615 (E.D. Ark. 1959); John
P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453, 468 (1965).
171. Monyek, supra note 96, at 766.
172. Libin, supra note 25, at 1152.
173. 274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1960).
174. Libin, supra note 25, at 1153.
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ognizes this delay in cash outflow. 175 However, even proponents of
the use of the credit cycle feel that unless some further adjustment is
made to the formula, the corporation's working capital reserve will not
be sufficient to cover all its expenses during the operating cycle. Thus
they urge that when the credit cycle is utilized, the corporation should
be permitted to add its current liabilities to the amount of its working
capital reserve."76  This variation on the analysis is deficient since work-
ing capital is defined as the excess of current assets over current lia-
bilities.1
77
Indeed, it has been suggested, in light of the reduction of current
liabilities in computing the working capital of the business, that if an
adjustment for the credit cycle is not made in the working capital com-
putations, the company would theoretically enjoy a double benefit."'8
This observation is based on the idea that the credit cycle and current
liabilities represent the same item. "[Tihus if ,the credit cycle is not
eliminated from the computation and the current liabilities are still used
to reduce current assets, then the company is allowed to accumulate
for the same outlay twice."' 79 Even if it is assumed that they repre-
sent the same concept, they do not represent the same expense since
one represents past credit extended while the credit cycle is a projection
of the future credit that will be available to the business. The current
liabilities of the business represent a separate need of the business,
which bears no relationship to the needs of the business yet to be in-
curred.
D. Taxes
Over strong objection by counsel the court in Bardahl Manufactur-
ing Co. and BardahI International Corp. excluded federal taxes paid
by the corporation from the operational expenses of the business. The
justification for the exclusion was aptly stated in Bardahi International:
175. S. WErrHORN & R. NOALL, supra note 22, at 77; Zeigler, supra note 40, at 99.
176. S. WETHoRN & R. NOALL, supra note 22, at 77; Zeigler, supra note 40, at 99;
cf. Hamel, supra note 22, at 58, who finds this approach as appealing conceptually as
the one year rule of J.L. Goodman.
177. See Libin, supra note 25, at 1150.
178. Id. at 1153.
179. Current liabilities represent those costs accruing before a stated point in
time (usually the end of a fiscal year) which become expenses subsequent
to this point in time. Working capital, however, measures expenses not at a
point in time but over a period of time. Since costs incurred in a given period
but becoming expenses afterward will offset costs incurred prior to the period
but becoming expenses within its duration, working capital need not take into
account current liabilities.
Luria, supra note 23, at 803.
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First, with reference to the inclusion of income tax for the fol-
lowing year as a cost of operating during the cycle, we agree with
respondent that it should not be included, and we have not in-
cluded it in our computations. In its computations petitioner has
added to the costs of goods sold and other operating expenses the
income tax actually incurred by petitioner in the subsequent year
as taken from the corporate return for the subsequent year. Fed-
eral income taxes would be incurred in the following year only if
there are sufficient earnings from future profitable operations to re-
quire their imposition and we do not believe that this is the kind
of operating expense for which cash is needed in advance. These
taxes would not normally have to be paid until after the profits are
earned and, for the most part, received. s80
When viewed with the fact that in 1966 corporations paid no tax until
their returns were filed, the result reached by the court was a proper
one. However, since that time Congress passed an estimated corporate
income tax effective for the years beginning after December 31,
1967.'18 As a result of this change, all the commentators agree that
the holding of Bardahl as to taxes is no longer applicable and that the
federal income taxes should be reflected in the computations.8 2
Therefore, the only question left unanswered is how to properly reflect
these expenses in the analysis.
The writers who have touched on the problem of federal taxes
have assumed without much analysis that these expenses should be
treated like any other costs of the business.
At the moment a product is sold the company becomes liable for
a proportional part of the federal income tax, despite the fact that
it may not receive the funds for some time. Nevertheless, it is nec-
essary to spin off from the net cycle sufficient funds to provide for
this "cost" as it accrues during the year . . . . Because of the
change in the collection of federal income taxes which will be accel-
erated, it follows that they are a "cost" to which the net cycle dec-
imal should be applied in the same manner as cost of goods sold
and any other expenses.'
83
Although the above analysis is appealing, it fails to consider an im-
portant aspect in the payment of taxes that has been raised in another
context.
Several of the same authors who found the Bardahl formula de-
ficient for failure to deal with expenses that are not uniformly incurred
180. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1062-66.
181. INT. RPv. CODE OF 1954, § 6154(a).
182. Horvitz, supra note 54, at 331; Trethewey, supra note 52, at 751.
183. Trethewey, supra note 52, at 751.
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during the year urge that the payment of federal taxes be treated as
any other "cost."'18 4 Corporations are required under the new estimated
tax payment sections of the Internal Revenue Code to pay their esti-
mated tax liability in four quarterly installments. 18 5 Therefore, it would
appear that these taxes should also be viewed as expenses not uniformly
incurred. During the cycle in which a quarterly installment becomes
due, there will be an extraordinary cash need which must be satisfied.
The only way to meet this need is to recognize the extraordinary na-
ture of the expense and treat it as a separate item.186 If the tax is in-
cluded with the other costs of the business to which the net cycle deci-
mal is applied, a working capital shortage may result. If the operating
cycle is shorter than the installment quarter, the taxpayer will be allowed
only enough working capital to pay for that portion of the tax due in
that cycle.'
7
The court in BardahI International Corp. refused to recognize the
problem of sporadic expenditures incurred during the year.'8 8 The
court rejected the argument that large cash outlays for advertising,
which were expected to be expended in the early part of the following
184. See, e.g., Faber, supra note 33, at 275; Trethewey, supra note 52, at 749.
185. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6154(b).
186. Under this analysis only the amount of the projected quarterly installment
should be treated as an extraordinary expense.
187. Even if the operating cycle is longer than the installment quarter, the estimated
quarterly payment should be treated as an extraordinary expense rather than an expense
to which the decimal is applied. Since only one installment can possibly come due dur-
ing the operating cycle, unless it is longer than six months in which case two install-
ments would be the proper amount, then to use the decimal amount is to provide an
excess of working capital for taxes.
In the alternative, it could be argued that the entire estimated tax liability should
be treated as an extraordinary expense and thus should be provided for in the available
working capital. Every dollar of income theoretically contains a percentage of potential
tax liability, thus the argument goes that the business will be able to pay its estimated
tax as it falls due out of this income. However, for a business that is seasonal in nature
or has very unsophisticated accounting records, this may not be true. A business with
poor accounting records may well be paying the tax when in fact it may or may not
be making a profit. Due to the nature of its record keeping it will not be able to tell
until the end of the year when the final audit is performed, exactly what its liability
was, if any. Since it is reasonable for a taxpayer to wish to avoid the estimated tax
penalty, especially when it does not know what its tax liability will be, then it will na-
turally be prone to pay all its expected tax liability based on the income of the previous
year. Thus during the following year it will "incur" an expense that the cash flow of
the business will be able to cover. A seasonal business, when one or more of the tax
installments comes due, may not have earned a profit from which these taxes may be
paid. As a result the business will be forced to borrow in order to pay its estimated
tax liability. Both situations described above call for a working capital reserve large
enough to carry the business' tax liability for the entire year and not just a quarterly
installment.
188. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1063.
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year, should be excluded from the formula. The court reasoned that
the taxpayer was still protected from working capital deficiencies by the
inclusion of a pro rata part of its annual advertising costs in the compu-
tation of the company's working capital needs. The court failed to real-
ize that this approach would still leave the company short of working
capital to meet these costs. When federal taxes are included in the
computation, likewise, only a pro rata portion is represented by the
working capital accumulated. The whole purpose of a statistical anal-
ysis is to provide sufficient working capital to cover all the operating
costs that may be incurred in an entire operating cycle. Since the
quarterly installment will certainly fall within an operating cycle, the
pro rata portion of the tax provided under the Bardahl International
approach will not be sufficient to meet the full needs of the business
during that cycle.
It should be kept in mind that the Bardahl court did not ignore
corporate income taxes altogether. "We have provided for payment
of the lump sum taxes due with the returns by including them in cur-
rent liabilities in computing the excess of net liquid assets available as
working capital."''1 9 In effect the taxpayer received a dollar-for-dollar
reduction in excess working capital for his tax liability. This fact pre-
sents an interesting situation. By treating the federal taxes as a part
of the operating expenses, only a portion, a small portion in most cases,
will be used in determining reasonable working capital levels. How-
ever, a corporation that fails to pay its estimated tax would presumably
be allowed to offset working capital by the resulting liability as in
Bardahl on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Therefore, it is theoretically pos-
sible to have a case in which a company which complied with the esti-
mated tax requirements might be subject to the accumulated earnings
tax penalty, while the same company, if willing to pay the smaller esti-
mated tax penalty, might avoid such a result.
V. LiQuIDiTY AND EARNED SURPLUS
The statutory provisions providing for the accumulated earnings
tax penalty require an objective analysis of whether "earnings and prof-
its" have been allowed to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of
the business. 190 Following the literal language of the statute, many of
the early decisions focused their analysis on the amount of the corpo-
189. Id. at 1062.
190. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 533; see note 15 supra.
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ration's undistributed earnings for the year in question and the accumut-
lated earnings or surplus.191 This analysis failed to recognize that a
corporation cannot distribute "earnings" since accumulated earnings
"are merely the result received by subtracting the corporation's liabil-
ities and capital stock from the amount of its assets."1 92 Therefore,
since accumulated earnings are reflected by an increase in value of all
the corporation's assets, the proper focus of the court's analysis should
be on the size and character of those assets rather than the mere size
of the "surplus. 19 3
The first decision to recognize this fact appeared in 1957 in Smoot
Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner.1 94 This decision and subse-
quent ones 9 5 recognized that a corporation should generally not be sub-
ject to the penalty tax to the extent that accumulated earnings have
been translated into business-related assets. As a result, an analysis
should be made of the nature of the asset and its relation to the busi-
ness. In keeping with this reasoning, the court held that "to the extent
the surplus has been translated into plant expansion, increased receiv-
ables, enlarged inventories, or other assets related to its business, the
corporation may accumulate surplus with impunity."19 6  Since these
assets constitute an active part of the operations of the business, it is
not generally considered feasible for a corporation to pay dividends in
kind out of such assets.
As a result of the Smoot analysis, the recent decisions tend to in-
dicate that the basic test should be whether the corporation has suffi-
cient liquidity in "non-operating liquid assets" sufficient to meet its
business needs.1 97  Thus, accumulation of non-operating liquid assets
"such as cash and marketable securities have to be justified as neces-
sary for business related needs."' 98  However, a uniform position has
191. Zeigler, supra note 40, at 84; see, e.g., World Publishing Co. v. United States,
169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948); W.H. Gunlocke Chair Co. v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d
791 (2d Cir. 1944), affg 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1424, 1432 (1943); F.E. Watkins Motor
Co., 31 T.C. 288, 299 (1958).
192. Zeigler, supra note 40, at 84.
193. Faber Cement Block Co., 50 T.C. 317 (1968).
194. 241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1957).
195. See, e.g., Mead's Bakery, Inc., 364 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1966); Electric Regula-
tor Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964); John P. Scripps Newspapers,
44 T.C. 453 (1965); Carolina Rubber Hose Co., 34 P-H Ct. Mem. 1268 (1965); Sandy
Estate Co., 43 T.C. 361 (1964).
196. 274 F.2d at 501.
197. See, e.g., Faber Cement Block Co., 50 T.C. 317, 329 (1968).
198. Zeigler, supra note 40, at 85. See Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner,
336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964).
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not been achieved on the types of assets that should be combined with
cash in computing available working capital or "non-operating liquid
assets."
Several decisions have indicated that a taxpayer must justify not
only the accumulation of cash and marketable securities but also inven-
tory and accounts receivable. 199 The courts advocating this position
have treated inventory and accounts receivable as liquid assets and thus
a part of the analysis in determining whether there has been an im-
proper accumulation. This is a direct contradiction to the holding of
Smoot that such assets should be treated as a business application of
funds, which may be accumulated with "impunity." Since such assets
are in fact a business application of funds and thus are not generally
available for the payment of dividends, -the only explanation for the
position taken by these courts is that they feared abuse of the liberal
rule of Smoot. One such suggested abuse is that a corporation could
convert its cash liquid assets into inventory by stockpiling its inventory
in amounts far in exess of the level necessary for the operation of the
business.200 In addition, a company that utilizes speculative commod-
ities such as gold, copper, or zinc in its manufacturing operations could
abuse the rule by purchasing sufficient quantities of these commodities
to constitute an investment rather than a normal business acquisition.
201
The fears of potential abuse of the Smoot decision were dealt with
in Sears Oil Corp. v. Commissioner20 2 in which the court specifically
qualified the decision in Smoot by stating that "[tihe inventory must be
needed in the business; to the extent that it is not, it cannot be accumu-
lated with impunity. 20 3 The Sears court ruled that the corporation
is required to show that its inventory level was not in excess of the
needs of its business. This position -requires a subjective analysis of
the individual needs and problems of the business in meeting its in-
ventory demands. Because of the tremendous burden which this may
put on a taxpayer, such an approach may lead to the automatic con-
clusion that the business has unreasonably accumulated its inventory
and therefore that the inventory should be treated as a liquid asset.
Even though this approach by the court is a step in the right direction,
199. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1051 (1966); Ted Bates & Co.,
34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1476 (1965); Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123
(1965); see Zeigler, supra note 40, at 88 (an attempt to distinguish these cases).
200. Zeigler, supra note 40, at 88.
201. Id. at 88-89.
202. 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966).
203. Id. at 197.
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the ultimate result is not much different than that taken in the Bardahl
and Bates cases.
A more enlightened approach is reflected in the opinions of Caro-
lina Rubber Hose Co.20 4 and Eberle Tanning Co. 205  With a slight
variation, the courts in these cases continued to follow the "impunity"
rule of Smoot. Under their approach inventory and accounts receiv-
able are presumed to be related to the needs of the business and thus
unavailable as working capital to meet the other anticipated needs of
the business or for the payment of dividends. To the extent that the
Commissioner can prove that there has been a deliberate build-up be-
yond the reasonable needs of the business, the excess should be treated
as a liquid asset available for the payment of dividends.200 .
One writer argues that if inventory is excluded from working cap-
ital as proposed here, the taxpayer will be permitted to accumulate
twice that which is necessary to meet the needs of the business.20 7 By
excluding the inventory from working capital, the operating cycle for-
mula ,through the production subcycle permits an accumulation of suffi-
cient cash or other working capital to cover the costs of raw materials
and all other costs needed to carry the corporation through its opera-
ting cycle even though it already -has on hand inventory adequate to
provide in full the materials needed during that cycle.208 Theoretically,
the argument goes, the company is allowed to provide for the same
need twice, once represented in the inventory and once again represented
by the cost provided for in the operating cycle, which is now represented
by other working capital. The fallacy in this analysis is that the costs
for which there is an accumulation in the operating cycle are not repre-
sented by the inventory balance. The operating cycle attempts to pro-
vide for the costs that will carry the business through a complete cycle.
This is based on the premise that the business will be able to regen-
erate its inventory balance as the old inventory is sold. Thus totally
204. 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1268 (1965).
205. 29 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1153 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
206. See, e.g., Faber Cement Block Co., 50 T.C. 317, 329-30 (1968). See generally
United Block Co. v. Helvering, 123 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1941) where the court stated:
Accounts receivable are, to say the most, a questionable quick asset; for al-
though merchants do at times assign them in regular course and perhaps man-
ufacturers also, the practice is not common, as far as we know; and at best
is an expensive way to raise money, and one not calculated to improve the
credit of him who has recourse to it.
Id. at 706.
207. Monyek, supra note 96, at 765.
208. Id.
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new raw materials need to be provided for in the working capital re-
serve in order to produce the new inventory.
The controversy has not stopped with inventories and accounts re-
ceivable; it has flowed over into other areas. For example, in Sterling
Distributors, Inc. v. United States209 the government argued that the
value of bonds owned by the taxpayer should be included in its compu-
tation of liquid assets. The court found that quick or liquid assets are
those assets that can be quickly converted into cash with very little sac-
rifice, and since the bonds in question were pledged to governmental
agencies for the payment of taxes, and thus not available for the pay-
ment of dividends, they should not be included in liquid assets.21 0 Also
in John P. Scripps Newspapers211 the government argued that peti-
tioner's investment in preferred stock should be considered a current
asset. The court stated that:
While we agree that the preferred stock was readily convertible into
cash, we do not agree that it should be considered a current asset
in this case. Petitioner purchased the stock in order to provide a
return equal to the return it was required to pay the employees cov-
ered by its profit-sharing plan. At the same time, petitioner in-
tended to partially "fund" its fixed liability under the profit-sharing
plan. An asset used to fund a fixed liability can no longer be con-
sidered as a current asset.212
One conclusion that can be drawn from the above decisions is that a
current or liquid asset for accounting purposes may or may not be
treated as a current asset and thus as part of working capital for pur-
poses of an accumulated earnings tax penalty computation.21 3
The treatment of prepaid expenses has been another topic of con-
siderable controversy in this area. 1 4 Although prepaid expenses are
considered a current asset for accounting purposes, the question exists
whether these should properly be considered a current asset for section
531 purposes. Faced with -the question of how to treat prepaid ex-
penses, the court in BardahI International felt that they should be prop-
erly included in current assets since these expenses were included in the
209. 313 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1963).
210. Id. at 808.
211. 44 T.C. 453 (1965).
212. Id. at 472.
213. See also American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. United States, 29 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 1301 (D. Md. 1972); Dahlem Constr. Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 103
(W.D. Ky. 1966); Golconda Mining Corp., 58 T.C. 139 (1966).
214. See, e.g., Empire Steel Castings, Inc., 43 P-H TAx C'. REP. & Mrm. Dac.
(43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 74,034 (Feb. 16, 1974); Faber, supra note 33, 274-75; Mon-
yek, supra note 96, at 767.
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costs of running the business during the operating cycle.215  This ap-
proach seems highly questionable.2 16 To include prepaid expenses in
working capital is tantamount to requiring them to be available for
the payment of dividends. Also, since by definition a prepaid expense
represents a cost of doing business in the subsequent year which would
normally give rise to a need for cash in the following year, it would
seem inappropriate to include a provision for such expenditure in the
operating expenses to which the net cycle decimal is applied. As a
result, prepaid expenses should be excluded from net liquid assets and
the expenditure should also be excluded from the operating expenses
in computing the ordinary working capital needs of the business cy-
cle. 21
7
Due to the importance of the 'net liquid asset figure in the deter-
mination of whether there has been an unreasonable accumulation of
earnings, an alert taxpayer would be well advised to make a careful
analysis of its entire balance sheet. Such an analysis may reveal the
existence of "non-current" current assets which should not be properly
considered available for the payment of dividends or to meet future ex-
penses.218
VI. CONCLUSION
The determination of the reasonable needs of the business has
emerged as the most important element in avoiding the imposition of
the accumulated earnings tax. The reasonable needs of a business are
comprised of two elements, the operational needs and the future extra-
ordinary needs. 19 In many instances courts have ignored the opera-
tional needs of the business in their analysis.220 This deficiency in an-
215. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1061-62.
216. See New England Woodenware v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 111, 115 (D.
Mass. 1968); Nodell Motors, Inc., 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 1126, 1135 (1967).
217. See, e.g., Faber, supra note 33, at 275.
218. See, e.g., Sandy Estate Co., 43 T.C. 361, 377 (1964); Wean Eng'r Co., 12
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1082, 1085 (1943) (The court excluded certain investments held
by the taxpayer from working capital. These investments were in companies that the
taxpayer hoped to make customers or retain as customers). Another area of controversy
is whether marketable securities which are reflected on the balance sheet should be
valued at cost or fair market value or some variation of the two for the purpose of corn-
puting available working capital. See Comment, Accumulated Earnings Tax: Should Mar-
ketable Securities Be Valued at Cost or at Fair Market Value in Determining the Rea-
sonableness of Further Accumulations of Income?, 40 BROOKLYN L. RBv. 192 (1973);
Comment, The Accumulated Earnings Tax: The Smoot Analysis and Valuation of Mar-
ketable Securities, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 507 (1973).
219. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
220. See, e.g., Hardin's Bakeries, Inc. v. Martin, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 647 (S.D.
Miss. 1967) (an extreme example even though the taxpayer was victorious).
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alysis is regrettable. The use of the operating cycle approach has made
the computation of the operational requirements of a business far easier
than that required for determining the extraordinary future needs.221
The widespread acceptance of the operating cycle by courts and
commentators may be attributed to its sophistication, objectivity, and
simplicity. The Bardahi opinion marked the first use of a statistical
analysis based on generally accepted accounting principles in determin-
ing the reasonable operational requirements of a business. Until that
time court opinions were devoid of any meaningful analysis. Instead,
they relied on some questionable "rules of thumb." The Bardahl for-
mula appears -to be at least a step in the right direction.222 The statistical
analysis achieved through the operating cycle approach adds an objec-
tive element to the analysis. Since financial data is readily available
to the court and, generally, the statistical analysis involves only a pure
mathematical computation, the court is not required to second-guess
the management of the corporation about what in fact are the "reason-
able needs" of the business. In addition, it can be used as a valuable
planning -tool by the taxpayer in avoiding section 531 attacks.
Although the Bardahl formula -appears -to be highly valuable, it
is not without its faults.223 However, if one is aware of the limitations
of the Bardahl approach, the objections raised to the formula are sub-
stantially diminished. These limitations can be eliminated in many
cases through the use of various refinements and variations which can
result in substantial increases in the working capital reserve.224
Although the Bardahl formula has been applied in a somewhat
uniform fashion, courts should retain a flexible approach in applying
the formula in order to meet the individual needs of the business.
Each individual fact and circumstance of the company should be
studied in depth to determine the effect these unique features will have
221. In the majority of cases the business will have to make only a relatively easy
mathematical computation to determine its operational needs. As contrasted with "other
anticipated needs" there is no problem in proving that the earnings are being accumu-
lated for a particular purpose, that the purpose is a legitimate activity of the corporation
or that such needs were planned for at the end of the year in question. S. WErrIoRN
& R. NOALL, supra note 22, at 49.
222. See, e.g., Hardin v. United States, 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972). "This tech-
nique represents an attempt to avert inflexibility and imprecision that results from seek-
ing to define a 'reasonable' accumulation in terms of anticipated operating expenses for
a fixed period of time. . . regardless of the nature of the business under consideration."
Id. at 870 n.8.
223. See Part IV supra.
224. See notes 147-49 and accompanying text supra, as to the utility of a peak vor-
$Vs a average Treiva1ble or inveatory cycle,
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